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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Bailey v.
United States:
A DRUG
TRAFFICKER
MUST "'ACTIVELY
EMPLOY" A
FIREARM IN
ORDER TO
SUSTAIN A
CONVICTION
UNDER THE "USE"
PROVISION OF
18 U.S.CA. SECTION
924(c) (1) (1984).

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the
United States, inBaileyv. UnitedStates, Il6S.Ct.50l (1995),
held that in order to sustain a
conviction, under 18 U.S.c.A.
section 924( c)(1 )(1984), for
"use" of a firearm while committing a drug related offense,
the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant "actively employed" the firearm
during the offense. The Court's
interpretation ofthe term "use"
in the context of section
924( c)(1) makes numerous
courts' previously articulated
standards for "use" in obtaining a conviction obsolete.
Furthermore, the Court's ruling, while affecting the interpretation of "use" under section
924(c)(1), leaves the companion "carry" provision open for
future interpretation.
In May 1989, Roland
Bailey ("Bailey") was stopped
for a traffic violation and was
ordered from his vehicle when
he failed to produce a driver's
license. As he stepped out of
the vehicle, the police officer
saw Bailey put something between the seat and the console.
A subsequent search of the
vehicle revealed a single bullet
and thirty grams of cocaine in
the driver's compartment as
well as a large amount of cash
and a loaded nine millimeter
handgun in the trunk. Bailey
was charged with several
counts, including "using or carrying" a firearm in violation of
section 924(c)( 1), which provides in relevant part, that anyone convicted of "using or

carrying" a firearm during the
commission of any drug trafficking or other violent crime
shall be committed to prison for
not less than five years.
Bailey was convicted by
a jury on all counts and was
given a prison sentence which
included a consecutive five year
term for the section 924(c)( 1)
conviction. Bailey appealed,
claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction under section 924(c)(l).
The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, however,
rejected Bailey's argument and
held that the jury could reasonably infer that the gun had been
used by Bailey to protect his
drugs and drug money as well
as to facilitate narcotic sales.
In the second ofthe two
consolidated cases, Candisha
Robinson ("Robinson") was
arrested and charged with several counts, including a violation of section 924(c)( 1), after
the police executed a search
warrant on her apartment following a drug related investigation. The search resulted in the
discovery of an unloaded,
holstered twenty-two caliber
Derringer handgun along with
almost eleven grams of crack
cocaine which were found inside a locked trunk in a bedroom closet. Robinson was
convicted on all counts and given a prison sentence which, similarto Bailey's, included a five
year term for the section
924(c)(1) violation. The district court denied Robinson's
motion for judgment of acquittal and Robinson appealed to
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the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia which reversed the conviction, holding
that under the wording of the
statute a person cannot be convicted for violating section
924(c)( 1) unless he or she actually uses the firearm in connection with a drug offense, even if
he or she had intended to use it
but did not.
In order to resolve the
inconsistencies in the application of section 924(c)(1), the
court of appeals consolidated
the two cases and agreed to
rehear them en banco Inadivided opinion, the court rejected
the previously used multi-factor standard and replaced it with
an accessibility and proximity
test. Thus, the court paid little
attention to the use of a firearm
and instead concerned itself
only with its accessibility. The
court found, in both cases, that
the firearm was readily accessible and close enough in proximity to the drug related crime
to sustain a section 924(c)(1)
conviction. Because ofthe conflict among circuit courts' application of section 924(c)( 1),
the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in
order to clarify the meaning of
the term "use" under the statute.
According to the Court,
the court of appeals erred in
applying an accessibility and
proximity standard; it did agree,
however, that "use" meant more
than mere possession. Bailey,
116 S. Ct. at 506. The error in
the accessibility standard, the
Court pointed out, was that un-
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der that standard every possession of a firearm would potentially trigger section 924( c)( 1)
and this was not how the Court
interpreted Congress' intention.
Id. If Congress had intended a
violation of section 924(c)(1)
for possession of a firearm in
connection with a drug offense,
it would have provided for this
in the statute, as it did in sections 922(g), 922G), 922(k) and
other gun-crime statutes. Id.
The issue for the Court, therefore, was to determine what
evidence must be presented in
order to trigger the "use" provision of section 924(c)(1). Id.
The Court began its
analysis with the language of
section 924(c)(1), noting that
judges should pay close attention to the wording of a statute,
especially when it describes the
elements of a crime. Id. at 50607. The language of section
924(c)( 1) criminalizes "using"
or "carrying" a firearm in connection with a drug offense. 18
U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(1984).
The Court explained that if the
term "use" was meant to be read
broadly, as the court of appeals
had done, there would be no
room left for the "carry" provision to have any separate and
distinct implication. Id. at 507.
The Government, however, argued that Congress' intention
was to combine the "use" and
"carry" prongs of the statute,
making its broad reading of
"use" appropriate. Id. at 508.
The Government supported its
argument by pointing out that
the original statute, written in
1968, provided for two sepa-

rate sections, one for the "use"
prong and one for the "carry"
prong. Id. at 507. Congress
then, in 1984, combined the two
sections into one. Id. The Court,
however, disagreed that Congress' intention in combining
the two sections was to strip
"use" and "carry" of their independent and distinct meanings.
Id. at 508. The Court opined
that "[i]f Congress had intended to deprive 'use' of its active
connotations, it could have simply substituted a more appropriate term "possession" to cover the conduct it wished to
reach." Id.
To clarify the meaning
of "use" under section
924(c)( 1), the Court provided a
few examples of what constitutes "using" or "actively employing" a firearm. Brandishing, displaying, bartering with,
striking with, and obviously firing or attempting to fire a firearm were examples which the
Court found violative of the
"use" prong of section
924(c)(1). Id. The Court went
on to say that even the mention
of a firearm, intended to bring
about a change in circumstance,
or the silent presence of a gun
could constitute a "use" under
the statute. Id.
Storing a gun near drugs
or drug proceeds, however,
would not be considered a "use"
without the requisite active
employment. Id. Without active employment, the storage is
no more than mere possession
which the Court had already
determined does not satisfy the
statute.ld. To resolve the ques-
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tion of what to do with an offender who keeps a gun close
by, to grab if necessary, the
Court pointed out that the Government has other means available to reach such a situation.
Id. at 509. One example is the
"carry" prong of section
924(c)(1). Id.
As a result ofthe Court's
interpretation, it was compelled
to rule that in neither of the
cases at bar was the gun actively employed, not while in the
trunk ofthe car and not while in
a holster in a locked trunk on
the floor of a closet. Id. The
Court, thus, reversed the convictions under the "use" prong
of section 924(c)(l) and remanded the cases back to the
district court to determine
whether
the "carry" prong
could sustain the convictions.
In reversing the convictions in Bailey, the Supreme
Court of the United States established a more discernible
standard for courts to use in
determining whether a drug trafficker has "used" a firearm under section 924(c)( 1). The firearm must have played an active

role in the crime in order to
constitute a violation of the
"use" prong of section
924(c)(1), whether it was actually fired by the defendant or
merely mentioned in order to
intimidate another party. Conversely, if the firearm was
present unbeknownst to any
party present at the crime other
than the defendant, it appears
that the Court would not consider the firearm "used" in the
crime. The decision which the
Supreme Court of the United
States reached in Bailey offers
little in the form of precedent
available on appeal to those individuals who have been convicted under similar circumstances for a section 924(c)( 1)
violation. The Court made no
mention ofmaking the decision
retroactive. Bailey does, however, serve to change the standard by which courts will analyze the "use" provision of the
statute. This change could conceivably have a detrimental effect on society. In the future,
drug dealers will not fear the
ramifications of possessing a
firearm while engaged in their

illicit acts, specifically the extra five year sentence associated with them if they are caught.
Thus, a gun will continue to be
a common tool of the trade for
drug dealers. This, of course,
assumes that those engaged in
the drug trade were ever concerned with the regulation to
begin with.
- Kevin Barner
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